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I think I am required to summarize (at least some of) the arguments
of my published paper on growth and political change - and to ad£ any
comments that are suggested by a year's return to this country. I have
J found this assignment very difficult. I have put down some unevenly argued
reflections; some I think are argued fully but others more sketchily. I
hope both categories will be of some value.
1. I am glad we are looking at "social and political change" - and not
just political change. There is a danger in focussing too heavily on
the possibilities of reform of the central political institutions of
the country. I think change in that area is probably a sufficient
condition for change in many other areas (though precisely what kind
and what degree of change is not clear); but I do not think it is a
. P necessary condition for various sorts of desirable change. Given this,
I think what might be useful is a listing - as concretely as possible -
' ' of features of the South African seen* which need "change", and a
piecemeal enquiry into the possible effects of continued economic growth
on them. I always find it extremely difficult to make a satisfactory
listing of this kind - there seems no obvimaly correct way of doing it,
The sort of thing I have in mind is: (i) poverty and unemployment;
(ii) social welfare deficiencies - i.e. inadequate pensions, health,
housing, urban amenities; (iii) inadequate schooling, skill-training and
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general development of human potential; (iv) so-called "petty
apartheid"; (v) economic discriminations and disabilities 7 relating
to occupational and geographical mobility, trade union recognition,
freedom of entrepreneurial initiative and asset acquisition; (vi)
the denial or serious qualification of a range of civil liberties;
(vii) the pervasive inequality of enjoyment of "the good life ' <-
as between the averaged racial groups; (viii) the monopolisation'^
with the exception of recent Homeland experiments - by Whites of
formal political power; (ix) the possibly thwarted "national* aspira7
J tions of Africans - or some Africans.
Of course there are interconnections between some of these: there
are features which if changed would lead on to other changes (in the
language of the Background Paper, p. 21). But I am inclined to doubt
that social systems in general - and the South African system in particular
have quite as much internal logic and coherence as is sometimes suggested.
Hence the possible value of a piecemeal approach.
I shall not in this paper carry out my own programme of piece-
meal enquiry - though I shall discuss parts of it. I list the inventory
x of features primarily because I want to draw your attention to the po"T1
sibility that growth may promote widely-approved changes under some
heads, but not others, and may indeed promote retrogression under some
heads - or that the political decision-makers may require (mistakenly
or correctly) retrogression under x as a precondition of non-interr
ference with, or active encouragement of, progress under y. To be a little
less abstract : it is commonly said when some change (or promise of
change) is being evaluated - "but almost simultaneously raids, bnns etc.
are being intensified", as though this is evidence that the :S.A. Government
is not serious about its promises. We must think about the possibilitv
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that the intensification of certain forms of "repression" is
precisely evidence of the seriousness with which certain deracialisinp.
and material-welfare-improving changes are intended.
2. Much discussion of this topic in the past assumed that influences would
run from the economic sphere (where growth was taking place) to other
areas in this society. Growth was thus thought of as having some
autonomy, some important degree of causal independence. I think this
is the correct view to take - at least in our South African situation.
• * [j make the point because H. Adam has recently asserted that much
of the argument about the effects of economic growth on the social and
political structure is futile because it fails to recognize the common
participation of both 'sectors1 in the system of social controls that
guarantee White domination]. I suggest three points that are relevant
here, (i) Economic decision-making is still largely decentralised i.e.
is not originated at the centre but carried out by large numbers of
economic agents with partial views and sectional interests. Moreover
the long-run consequences of economic changes are ambiguous and uncertain
,^\ and may well be ignored or heavily discounted. These facts are relevant
since numerous features of our economic, social and political arrangements
impose costs (of various sorts) on economic agents. It may be that .
viewed from the centre and within a sufficiently lengthy time-horizon
those costs will appear to be more than offset by benefits flowing from
the arrangements; but this will often not be apparent to individual
employers and others - who will seek to circumvent or to have changed
the offending features e.g. Physical Planning Act restrictions, rigidities
in employment, the failure to recognize trade unions, inadequate social
(3)
amenities and so on. - (ii) It seems clear that at present "the centre"
(viz. the National Party Government) puts a high priority on growth
itself - for security reasons among others. This means that they
will not intervene to stop or redirect many decentralised economic
decisions that have risky implications. (It is interesting to go back
to a 195U paper of Leo Kuper's to see him speculating incorrectly that
the National Party government would intervene to bias growth back
towards mining and agriculture), (ii) Growth in S. Africa involves
-?v sustained and major interchange with the world economy (as it does not
for the USSR and other continental economies). Amongst other things
we import our technology from abroad. It is not designed by local
Whites to meet the "socio-political requirements" of our system (perhaps
in some ways it ought to be.'). If modern technological developments
demand a massive human transformation of the labour force or of part of
the labour force, then that is what will materialse.
3. The Background Paper ends up by reminding us that we are "political
actors" (p. 23). I believe it is appropriate to stress that fact -
~\ because this debate only really makes sense when seen in the context of
political choices that have to be made about South Africa. In my own
experience in the past and present - and I think in that of others -
the choice-context within which these questions become urgent is that
in which we decide on our stance in relation to revolution and "armed
struggle". I am sure one does not have to consider the question in that
context, but I am equally sure that it is that context which has given
point (and heat) to much of the argument. We are arguing about the
possibility of "peaceful transition", (i) I take many of the
Revisionists to be saying: "There are either no changes, or no significant
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changes, or the changes taking place are in the wrong direction and
this will continue to be the case so long as growth takes place within
the current socio-political system. Significant change can only come
(if at all) as a result of international pressures and/or 'armed
struggle"1. (ii) My position is - and there is no space to argue
it fully - something like the following:-
(a) within the foreseeable future the violent overthrow of the
system is highly improbable;
(b) if it were to be overthrown the human costs to all in South Africa
would be staggering - and so would be the costs of serious but
unsuccessful attempts at overthrow;
(c) the South African system -partly at least in response to the needs
of, and the opportunities created by, economic growth * is
creating material welfare for all and changing away from some forms
racialism to a surprising extent;
(d) in South Africa there are probably severe limits to the extent to
which society can be both non-racial and liberal-social-democrati--
(by the standards of the Western liberal democracies South Africa
may have permanently to be satisfied with certain 'second-best
arrangements);
(e) in consequence of (a) - (d) we have no choice but to defend the
system against confrontational attack (in full consciousness of its
moral deficiencies and of the compromised nature of our stance) -
and to work within it, trying to allign ovrselves with those creative
forces which are producing a massive human transformation in the
society, and trying to do aowith far greater imagination than we
have employed in the past (see also section 7 below).
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It seems to me that - perhaps because this context of violent
struggle is not explicitly noted - the Background Paper lacks a dimen-
sion of (tragic) depth. Consider the three possible types of change
listed on pp. 21-2. I suppose implicit in (2) and (3) - since they
involve "radical restructuring" and "rapid restructuring" - is the
notion of severe conflict, violence etc.; but the vision is not at
all catastrophic - on the other side of conflict is black socialism
or capitalism, somebody wins (the blacks). There appears no sense of
a nobody-wins outcome (or, more exactly, of an everybody-loses result).
H. In my paper I attempted to criticize the work of some of the Revisionists
In general I have been confirmed in that critical stance since returning
to this country. Perhaps the writer the criticism of whose work enables
(Q )
me most easily to present what I have to say Is F.A. Johnstone.
(i) For Johnstone the fundamental discriminations in the economic system
were three features of the labour market which he termed the T'trade
union, educational and Income colour bars". The net effect of these was
to exclude non-Whites from economic power. This exclusion was crucial
. to the system because its joint goals were White supremacy (a monopoly
of power) and White prosperity (in substantial measure created by the
appropriative and exclusionary uses of political power). As long as
the system grows the exclusions/discriminations.are maintained as an
integral and functional part of the system (and in fact are reinforced
by circular causation). The prospects for non-Whites are bleak - both
in relation to power and to welfare ' (considering income, wealth
and education as means to welfare - as well as to power). By compari-
son with these "bars", job reservation and geographical segregation
are not fundamental features of the S. African system: if economic
growth causes their modification little is changed, (ii) I argued
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at considerable length in my paper that some of these propositions are
false. I am not at all sure that modifications in job reservation and
geographical segregation can be easily dismissed as insignificant -
even within Johnstone's framework. There seems a possible link, for
instance, between the macro-segregation pattern and White political
security - though this is difficult to prove. Certainly relaxations in
job reservation (legal and conventional) affect the alleged educational .
bar; and they almost certainly increase the probability that the trade-
^ union bar will eventually change or disappear. Moreover, writing after
the Ovambo strike, I was able to point to the fact that a legal ban
on strike action or the recognition of trade unions need not necessarily
be taken at face value: de facto industrial power may be considerably
greater than de jure. I denied that we can with accuracy talk of an
"educational bar", suggesting that a "queue for admission to full educa-
tion" might be a better image. I produced some figures relating to
Bantu education which suggested (contrary to the notions fixed in my
mind by the late 50fs and early 60's) that expenditure per head was
now rising and that the class-distribution of school-children was
slowly improving at the same time as the school-going total had expanded
dramatically. As regards the "income and wealth bar'* I took a more
tentative position. I denied any deep structural property of the
system which would guarantee that the majority of the population were
always absolutely poor or that there would not be substantial numbers
of Africans. Coloureds and Indians whose living standards would rise
to average <fliite levels It was difficult to make positive predictions
about the trends in average real incomes or income inequality
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(iii) Since October 1972 (when I wrote) it seems to me tfiat the
case I argued then: has been considerably strengthened by recent develop-
ments - and by further information now available to me.
(a) The strike and trade-union position is of course most startling.
(I suggest you go back and read Johnstone to see what the position
looked like in 1969). In 1973 despite the illegality of strikes some
70,000 Africans were involved in strikes or work-stoppages between mid-
January and mid-October, there was little violence used against them and
-v few prosecutions, many wage-increases were conceded, the Prime Minister
accepted that wages and labour relations needed to be improved, Act
70 of 1973 at last formally conceded to Africans the right to strike
under certain restricted conditions, and certain forms of plant-*based
(as distinct from industry-based) labour organisation are now being
officially encouraged. Again in 1971 strike-activity emerged and there
is a growing voice from prominent employers for the official recognition,
and admission to collective bargaining, of African trade-unions. In
1950 the non-Whites (mainly Coloureds and Asians) in registered trade
unions were slightly over a quarter of the total of White trade unionists.
J In 1970 they were just under a half of the White total. If all this
does not add up to a classic case of the balance of social forces beginning
to change I do not know what would .
<b) In the area of education, skill-training and jobnadvancement (to
group these together) there also seems to me to be evidence which more
than confirms the impression that there is no educational 'bar1' aimed
at permanently excluding non-Whites from income, wealth and economic
influence (or power). Rather we seem to be at a point in time where
the accent is shifting to the need (for a series of overlapping reason*)
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to invest on a large scale in educating, training and "developing"
those South Africans who have been behind (and partly kept behind)
the Whites in the educational and occupational queue. I can only
produce impressionistic evidence here. What I am interested in is
the trend: my emphasis is not on how unequal things are today hut on
(12)
whether Africans, Coloureds and Indians are making progress.
Expenditure on African education which was effectively pegged at one
stage roughly doubled in the 8 years from 1960/61 to 1968/69, and
roughly trebled in the 5 years from 1968/69 to 1973/74. The number
) of African children at school increased by 93% for 1950-60 and 82%
for 1960-70. Over time the percentage of the African population at
school has climbed from over 3% (1925) to 6,8% (1941) to 13,8% (1960)
to 18,5% (1970). Of course these children are heavily concentrated
in the lowest standards - but during a period of rapid growth in the
total intake (1961 - 1971) the percentage in the kindergarten standard"
fell from 44,3% to 40,7%, that in Stds. I-VI rose from 52,8% to 54,6^,
(14)
and that in the secondary school increased from 2,9% to 4,7%. If
we consider the picture for Coloured and Indian education there is
^ also very clear-cut evidence of recent progress. The number of Coloured
children at school increased in the 1960-70 decade by almost 70% (over
5% per annum) and climbed as a percentage of the population during that
decade from 20,2% to 25,5%. The Asian percentage of population at school
was roughly constant in the decade at the high level of between 26% and
27%. (The White percentage was 23,2% in 1970 - but they have a different
age-structure). There was improvement in the class-distribution of the
school-population in this period - most marked in the Asian case. Less
than 8% of Coloured school-children were in secondary school in 1950-54;
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• )
in 1971 the figure was 11,6%. Already by 1961, 13,9% of Asian school-
children were in secondary standards; by 1970 the figure had risen to
24,3% - which is roughly what the White figure was only 15 years before.
Over the 4 years (1968-71) Coloured J.C. candidates increased about
48% and passes by about 55%. Senior Certificate Coloured candidates
also increased strongly over the 8 years,(1964-71) and there was a
dramatic 140% increase in the number of S.C. passes - from an extremely
low 595 to 1424 (with the pass-rate rising from 44% to 63%). And
so we could go on. As you know some free books for Africans made
their appearance this year: the target is to have free textbooks (but
not set-books) universally by 1976. Each cohort of Coloured
children commencing school must now proceed to Std. 6 - an historic
breakthrough into compulsory education In the area of skill-
training and job-advancement there is a similar sort of picture. You
will know of the major decisions late last year to train Africans -
also in urban areas - with Government assistance; and of recent tax-
incentives to encourage firms to spend funds in this way. You will
know also of "artisan aids" in the mining, motor repair, electrical
and other industries. The motor assembly firms in the Port Elizabeth -
Uitenhage area are providing an extensive range of training facilities -
including the use of the company apprenticeship system and the 'adult
artisan'1 provisions of the Apprenticeship Act to train individuals from
(17)
all race-groups as toolmakers etc. The data in the 1969 and 1971
Manpower Surveys provide evidence in this general field. At the
artisan level I was interested to note that in 1971 Coloured artisans
and apprentices dominated the furniture trades; that the "racial balance
was changing in the printing trades (artisan White: Coloured ratio =
10 : 1; apprentice White : Coloured ratio 5 : 1 ) ; and that in the
building trades, whereas in 1967 there were more White apprenticeship
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contracts registered than Coloured by 1972 Coloured contracts were
double the White total. According to the Manpower Surveys Coloured
and Indian apprentices Increased as a percentage of total apprentices
in employment from 12,5% in 1969 to 1713% in 1971.<18)
(c) I have done a good deal of work on African* Coloured and Indian
standards-of-living (or real incomes) since coming back - and am con-
vinced that for the post-1960 period there is good evidence for believ-
ing that on average these groups have experienced a rising standard-
of-living. (The Personal Income per capita figures for 1960-70 given
in McGrath's paper to this Workshop are consistent with this impression).
I still have little notion of the determinants of this process and so
cannot predict future trends - either of level of real Income or of
inequality in relation to whites - but at least in recent times it
seems to ne that the system must be cleared of the charge that It is
(19)
unable to generate real income growth for non-Whites.
(iv) In siuenary, it seems to me quite clear that Johnstons was wrong
about South Africa in a number of important ways. His paper was an
interesting attempt at modelling the situation here. As I wrote in my
paper (pp.75-6) the underlying approach he used - with Its emphasis on
groups, their interests and goals, and their strategic and tactical
choices in pursuit of their goals - is promising end should be reworked
and developed not rejected. But Johnstons'* particular model (am dis-
tinct from the underlying approach) predicted that there were no endo-
genous tendencies to "progressive" modification of the South African
system: our society was entirely locked in to a vicious circle of caus-
ation from which we were apparently not able (at least on our own) to
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5.
break out. The process of economic growth benefits Whites because
they effectively monopolise the economic (and other) means to power
and the economic means to welfare.
The main thrust of my argument has been that economic growth
(as experienced currently in South Africa) is not compatible with
the discriminatory "colour-bars" that Johnston* pats at the centre of
the system as guarantees of White Monopoly. In the field of labour
organisation and trade union affairs, in for**! education and Industrial
training, and in the sphere of income and wealth distribution the weans
to welfare and the means to power are being Multiplied rapidly and
distributed sufficiently beyond the White boundaries to justify our
speaking of the presence of endogenous tendencies to "progressive".
modification.
There are other changes that night be listed - which don't fit into the
Johnstone framework, but which do I think have some relation to growth.
From late last year the Government began to talk of the need to do
something about African and Coloured urban conditions - housing, recre-
ational and other amenities, street-lighting, sewerage, general environ-
ment. There is some tendency here to rope in the private sector
i.e. large companies - and they often subsidise sporting and similar
amenities; but General Motors in Port Elizabeth, for instance, is cer-
tainly involved in housing subsidisation (or loan provisions) as well.
Note the inter-connection between the workers' willingness and ability
(21)
to work night-shifts and the availability (or not) of adequate policing.
street-lighting and efficient transport systi (22) Therv •vttle
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doubt to me that the Theron Commission will have a lot to say about all
these issues as they affect urban Coloured people - and my guess is
that the Government will seize the opportunity provided by the Report
(when it is made) to engage in further substantial expenditures on
(23)
Coloured "socio-economic upliftment11. I am not willing to predict that
migratory labour will diminish or disappear (though it may): but I do
think that despite evidence presented last night about intensifications
of the system and about technical devices to perpetuate, while reducing
(2i*)
-. the costs to employers, of the system - despite all that, there are
senses in which the human sufferings and costs (to workers) of the
system may have lessened. I appeal here to Alble Sachs's (as yet)
(25)
unpublished work on "race law" prosecutions. I think that growth
rationalisation has something to do with these changes - though it is
unlikely that it is the only factor involved. We know that prosecutions
under "the pass-laws" were down in 1972 (as compared with 1968) - after
many years (including recent years) in which there was a very strong
rising trend in prosecutions. The introduction of advice centres and
the switch of controls from administration by municipalities to that
_) by Bantu Affairs Administration Boards (with wider boundaries) may over
time be leading to fewer prosecutions, at least to fewer prosecutions
( 26 )
per head of population. In the same way 197»» saw the scrapping of
the "masters and servants'1 acts which imposed penal sanctions in the
area of labour contracts. Interestingly, and not surprisingly, they
( 27)
were falling into disuse before being removed from the statute-book.
6. Let me stop at this point - although there is a lot more detail we mi.rht
survey. What about political power? Can we discern anything that might
be called "political change" and which deserves to be noticed? I find
the discuasion of these questions difficult - but something eust be
attempted.
(i) As I suggested above (in section 1) a change in the distribution of
political power (certainly of formal political power) is not a necessary
condition for changes in the distribution of those 'goods' the alloca-
tion of which the struggle for political power ia often thought ultimately
to be about. I hare tried to show in sections H and 5 above that the
recent history of South Africa bears this out.
. (ii) I think we need to distinguish between formal political, economic
and other kinds of power - and the actual, de facto power situation. I
am not enough of a political philosopher to develop a full analysis of
the concept "power" (which is what we need at this point). However I
can suggest some ways (using an economist's tools) in which a divergence
between the de jure and de facto power-situations nay emerge, first,
if A and B are in conflict and A monopolises formal (legal) power then
to concentrate on that power monopoly in your analysis of the situation
may be misleading if over time A and B develop certain common interests
and their conflict is moderated. Secondly, the coats for the exerciser
J of the use of formal power may change (rise) - so that formal power is
not used although available, or not used to the same extent or as effect-
ively as formerly. Then again, certain options - the availability of
which was part of the definition of the extent of power - may disappear
(although it may be possible to interpret most cases of this sort as
involving changes in costs). I suggest that the mild response to African
illegal strike-activity in 1973 and 197* is partly accounted for by the
first two cases I have listed. I am not claiming originality or intel-
lectual credit for these sketchy remarks - but I am surprised at the
omission of such considerations in much of our academic discussion (whereas
in fact they figure quite commonly in everyday comment on public matters).
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(iii) I an frankly astonished at the failure of anybody thus far at the
Workshop to take seriously the possibility that the institutions of
"separate development" will turn out to be instruments through which
political power is significantly redistributed - or through which real
political change materialises. I can understand the view that change
of this sort - or through such channels - is not desirable* or not as
desirable as certain alternative political changes; but 1 do not under-
stand how one can fail to discuss the possibility that this is how change
will happen. Take the Coloured case: why oust the only significant
political advance be in common franchise terms? I do not see why it is
not possible to give powers to the Coloured Persons' Representative
Council (or to a joint committee of it and the Cabinet) to propose, negot-
iate about and refer legislation - or (if we become very daring) to veto
legislation. And if so, is there no redistribution of political power?
Will the imposition of new discriminations and the intensification of old
ones not have become less probable? Will pressures in fact not build up
for "socio-economic uplift" and the scrapping of discriminations? How else
after all does the National Party enable its client-party to fight an
) election on the basis of a universal franchise with any reasonable chance
of success? And if Its clients do not succeed it will be faced by a
majority in the CFRC threatening the continued operation of separate
representative Institutions altogether. Of course if that happens it will
not be the end of the road for the National Party - they will not fall
from power! - but I do not think it will be a no-cost (or even low-cost)
outcome for them. In which case they will be ready to pay some price to
avoid it.(28)
(iv) I could at some length develop a similar sort of case in relation to
the Homelands policy. I shall not do so hare. 9* I shall limit myself
to reiterating the point that "separate" politics have already made some
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difference to the odds attaching to various possible political outcomes
and (which is rather more what I wish to stress here) must be considered
as a possible direction of change in response to the pressures that
growth (and the other forces at work on, and in, South Africa) are creating.
Michael O'Dowd says that his overall predictions will have been falsified
if by 1980 (or thereabouts) no substantial political changes - involving
an extension of political participation or power-sharing - have occurred;
I certainly would be prepared to count certain kinds of conceivable
developments within the "separate development" framework as evidence
favourable to O'Dowd's position.
7. I want to say something store about this issue of "separate development"
(or "macro-segregation" as van den Berghe called it) and its connection
with our discussion of the effects of economic growth.
(i) As I suggested earlier the "common society" framework has simply been
taken for granted In the discussion (not just here at the Workshop but in
general). I think this is unfortunate and a mistake - though it is
(31)historically intelligible. It is perhaps worth reminding ourselves
that the most eminent academic economist South Africa has produced spent
time In the 1960*8 saying in public that South Africa's economic growth
would make her wealthy enough to be able to afford partition at some stage
in the future/32*
(il) There are a number of reasons why - despite the heavy Integratlonist
bias of the usual growth argument - it seems sensible to think here about
political proposals (and possible political outcomes) involving racial and
ethnic separation or differentiation of some sort. First, the "Homelands"
policy Is aa much a fact as Is economic growth - and I doubt that It is
going to wither away and die. Secondly there has been a shift among many
overseas observers towards recognition of the legitimacy of athnic aspir-
(33)
at Ions and of the frequent long-run intractability of ethnic group conflicts.
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Thirdly, there is some evidence of an altering attitude to ethnic group-
(3*0
identities among English-speaking intellectuals in this country.
The most interesting example of this for our particular discussions is
the assertion by Michael O'Dowd at the recent 1820 Conference that
"...it [s. Africa] is a society which, though not unique in the diversity
of its population is far more diverse than the countries which we tend
to regard as models, so that even when we do reach the level of an affluent
society...we will require a fora of social and political organisation
significantly different from what we tend to regard as the standard pattern."
(my emphasis).
(iii) I have no detailed views about what this form of organization will -
or should - be. Z assume it will involve more ethnic-community-based,
"separate" institutions than is "standard11 - though that is not incompatible
with a lot more cross-cutting participation in voluntary associations and
social/cultural organizations than exists at present. Within some such
mixed framework there will take place institutionalised and legitimated
inter-group conflict over "group shares" of political, social and economic
resources (including the crucial "resource" of the central political and
(- administrative apparatus). The point I wish to emphasise is not the
separateness (the elements of "segregation", if you like) - I am really
taking that for granted * but the fact that if such conflict is to be
contained at a level where "bargaining coats" are tolerable (for all) then
we shall all have to be imaginative and innovative in our forward thinking
and planning.
I am emphasising imagination and innovation for two reasons. First,
the O'Dowd thesis can seem to inply that there is an inevitability about
social and political progress - so long as economic growth takes place
the rest will folia*. rew^rer* even if *e cruld predict with certainty
a satisfactory outcoa* in tfcla. country, people vould atiil have to invent
the new inatitiriss**, s«cu. •• acceptance for then and find ways of defusing
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and Moderating the social and economic inequality we are heirs to.
Secondly, we need to be able to give people rational grounds for
1
 hope - by sketching in creative possibilities.
There are a number of directions it seems to me worth exploring.
First, it ought to be possible to devise a series of ways in which
"marginal redistribution" between Whites and others is built into the
system - both at private and public initiative. The global objective
might be the transference of x% of the annual Increase of the GNP to
(37)
non-whites. Secondly, I see no reason why there should not be an
• '• expansion of the network of welfare provisions for the mass of the
population (or the "progressive" sections of the masses) before a
political "settlement" is reached. Thirdly, I am convinced that one
of our urgent requirements is going to be a set of plausible rational-
isations for these redistributions. In particular I suggest that the
notion of historical compensation (although potentially explosive and
destabilising) ought to be developed. Fourthly, I incline to the view
that Government, and the authorities in general, will need to become
more interventionist and propagandist in promoting Ifbetter race relations'*,
f. This will Involve pressure on the media and will be controversial - but
there nay be no alternative.
(iv) Language is a focus around which problems cluster endemically -
and we shall have to approach them also with imagination, daring and will.
The current political balance (or imbalance) has kept some of these
problems relatively, though not completely, in the background - but the
shifting balance I have tried to describe will bring them into prominence.
What I want to say about language is as follows: a) The existence of
different mother-tongues In a single political state contributes an
obstacle of the most serious kind to the *aay functioning of common insti-
tutions at the mass level, b) Language differences tond to *ct as a
perennial source of discontent, sense of grievance and political
instability because in a multi-lingual environment the distribution of
job-opportunities and career-rewards will be biased in favour of those
(38)(in the Bain) who belong to the dominant language group. c) Precisely
for these reasons the cluster of questions centred on language-policy will
need very close attention. I think we shall also need to think hard about
the possibility of resource-allocation on a quite unprecedented scale
towards language-education and adult-instruction (for black and.white),
drawing business firms into the instructional network - indeed even the
domestic-service relationship.
(v) This section was intended as a discussion of economic growth and "separate
development". In fact it has been focussed on some necessary policies if we
are to confine within reasonable limits the group-conflicts that already
exist but which will become institutionalised within a system containing a
substantial political component of ethnic and racial separatism. Within
such a system economic growth seems to me to hold out a somewhat ambiguous
promise. On the one hand growth makes feasible the inter-racial transfer
of resources and the moderation of inequality: given the social and political
will and the perception that such policies are prudent or just (or both)
whites "can afford" action of this kind less painfully than before. (In
addition of course - as I have argued above - economic growth creates certain
new overlaps of interests and relations of interdependences at a certain
stage it produces Incentives for investing in the poor and unskilled, and
it begins to shift the balance of social forces). But on the other hand
economic growth may tend to create an illusion - that a common society and
common political institutions can be built as easily as the common economy
that already exists - and may tend to make men careless of (among other
(39)
things) the need to accommodate "diversity". '
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This suggests to me that there is a fundamental distinction
between (a) changes which represent the beginning of a shift in the
balance of social power in favour of blacks (and higher levels of
material welfare for substantial numbera of then) and (b) changes
which both represent power and welfare shifts to blacks and in addition
Improve the prospects for a desirable long-run outcone in the country
(however that outcome is characterised). To assert that (a)-type
changes are occurring is not necessarily to assert that they are also
(b)-type changes. It is my impression that O'Dowd does assert this -
and that his long-run desirable outcome to which change is leading is
characterised in liberal democratic and welfare-state terms with (we
now understand) some unspecified institutional provision for "diversity".
I an aore certain that the balance of forces is changing and the circle
of welfare is expanding than I as that future prospects are improving;
and in so far as I do find grounds for optimism about the long-run future
T am inclined to think there are stronger grounds for expecting some of
the O'Dowdian characteristics to materialise than there are for others.
There is a loose argument connecting economic growth positively with long'
run "stability" (in the sense of avoidance of catastrophe, not avoidance
of change) which is worth mentioning because of our uncertainties about
the long-run future and the»r«al possibility of catastrophe (which I
referred to earlier in section 3). This argument suggests that economic
growth of the sort we now have will encourage social differentiation and
stratification among non-whites, will diversify their interests and so
facilitate eventually interest-coalitions across ethnic and colour lines,
and thus defuse somewhat the racial conflict. I suspect none of us knows
nich ary certainty how to evaluate this view. Let me remind you simply
^ vhasv cl«avag«« *iiich are relevant here »ud which growth *ay I* e*p«otrd
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(i) Socio-economic (or class-type) differentiation is taking place in
all ethnic groups. This is being encouraged by the switch of educational
and employment policies from low-level mass absorption to sore differ-
entiated systems with opportunities for selective advancement up school
and fim hierarchies. It will presumably also be encouraged by those
aspects of "separate development" which create new administrative/
political posts (or Africanise existing ones) and subsidise enterprise
in trade, construction, transport and agriculture.
(ii) There are the usual differences between urban and rural Africans
(to over-simplify matters) reinforced by the discriminatory effects of
influx control. I argued in section 5 that there is currently a positive
response by the policy-makers to the need for improved urban conditions;
this must increase the cleavage. Indeed Francis Wilson has written
critically of the probability that there will develop a great gulf in
income, status and rights between urban "insiders" and migrant "outsiders",
(iii) The various African "nations" (or tribes, or ethnic communities) now
have some form of separate political institutions. Economic growth will
affect these "nations" differentially - certainly their "Homelands" (Kwazulu
and Bophutatswana have better prospects than the Transkei or Venda) and
possibly their citizen diasporas.
(iv) Language, general culture and historical experience have always differ-
entiated the Coloured and Indian groups from the Africans. Moreover they
have been better placed than the African to seize current opportunities for
socio-economic advancement; and in addition policy is to some extent building
them into the system as the beneficiaries of various kinds of discrimination.
To list such potential sources of conflict among blacks is not to forecast
anything firmly. The forces creating "non-white unity" (or African solidarity)
may be very powerful. The new elites (however we define there) may be more
conscious of their income and status inferiority to those whites they regard
(41)
as a reference group than aware of common interests with then. . And there
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is a bitter record after all of rejection and unfulfilled promises
which can provide the myth (if they need one) in terns of which to
justify long-run intransigence. However (for what this is worth) I
find it difficult entirely to resist the conclusion that ip so far
as economic growth accentuates certain of these divisions, and in so
far as it generates a social ideology In which material prosperity '
is accorded high value* It will Increase the probability that (what
I would call) stabilizing coalitions will be formed and non-explosive
strategies of conflict will be chosen. And if so then the beneficiaries
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Footnotes
I wrote a draft of this paper for the Durban WorkshoD while a University
Research Fellow of Rhodes University attached to the Institute of Social
Economic Research. I owe a great debt to the staff and fellows of the J
who helped to make ray stay very pleasant and reasonably productive. Iff
particular I am grateful to the Director, Professor (now Senator) Denis Worrall,
and to Professor Jeffrey Butler.
Norman Bromberger, "Economic Growth and Political Change in South A,fr}ea",
in Adrian Leftwich (ed.), South Africa : Economic Growth' and Political
C h a n g e ( A l l i s o n a n d B u s b y , L o n d o n , 1 9 7 4 ) . ' ^ " •••.-.•• •<•
In a lecture given during 1974 at Rhodes University. I understand that .
the lecture was a revised version of a paper prepared for the Mt. Kiscp
Conference on Southern Africa (1974) - the proceedings of which are to
be published (edited by Professors L.M. Thompson and J. Butler). In the
Workshop discussion the same sort of point as Adam's was made viz.
"politics and economics are so intertwined in South Africa that it is
not illuminating (and may be misleading) to try to distinguish them.'*
Jill Natrass made the interesting comment during discussion that th«
myriad choices of decentralised decision-makers can be co-ordinat<?4 t>y'
a price-system. On reflection I think that this comment helps to
clarify my point. (1) I am here discussing a case where there are social
and political externalities associated with private econoroic%decisions ;
and we know in general that 'the market" (a decentralised price-system)
fails to co-ordinate decisions optimally in the presence of externalities.
(2) Anyway the system of forward markets in ''commodity options'* necessary
for a decentralised price-system to co-ordinate decisions in an uncertain
inter-temporal world exists only in the most rudimentary form.
A very clear example of this was the Prime Minister's speech to rirht-
wing trade-unionists towards the end of 1973. He argued that a 5,7b' p.=jT
growth rate of GDP was required to bring down the number of African
unemployed - and it was necessary to do this for security reasons
 t
However a 5,75% p.a. growth rate would require White workers to be more
flexible about employment policies, (R.D.M. 6.11.73; also Transyaler
7.11.73 - ,,Hoe groeikoers nodig in S.AT77) ~""?"1 V( ''r"\
"The Control of Social Change
Forces, Vol. 33 (1954).
A South African Experiment", Social
I am not alleging that all those favouring the "Revisionist" position
support "armed struggle". For one thing, it may be possible to conceiw
of some alternative route to "significant change". For another, it is
possible to deny that "significant change" is taking place at present
but be quite unable to suggest any strategy for bringing it about.
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7. A clear example of this approach is R. First, J. Steele and C. Gurney :
The South African Connection (Temple Smith, London, 1972).
8. F.A. Johnstone, "White Prosperity and White Supremacy in South Africa
Today", African Affairs,April 1970. I believe Johnstone has written a
later and more formalised paper in the same area; I regret that I
have not been able to obtain a.copy.
9. I owe the "means to power / means to welfare" distinction in this sort
of context to Professor Jeffrey Butler - along with much else.
10. 1950 : 50 Years, G-18 ; 1970 : SAIRR Survey 1972, p. 333.
11. I imagine that skilled labour shortages are the most important of these
reasons. Startlingly the annual number of South African apprentices
reaching artisan status during the years 1960-1967 actually declined
gradually. Growth of GNP was partly sustained by a considerable influx
of immigrant artisans - in 1965 and 1966 the net supply from abroad
exceeded the number of local entrants to the skilled labour market ;
but by 1970 this inflow had declined. See Mercabank, Focus on Key Economic
Issues (March 1972 - Labour Trends, and July 1973 - Manpower).
12. This does not mean that I think inequality is an unimportant issue not
worthy of emphasis. But I do think it must be studied over time - and
so one needs first to establish reliable time-series data for the separate
groups.
13. I think these rates of increase have the right order of magnitude (with
the recent trebling perhaps an overestimate : 2.6-fold - 2.8-fold may be
closer) but the precise figures for expenditure are subject to some
uncertainty. The figures I am using are 1960/61 - R18,852,514 ; 1968/6$ -
R29,756,794 (+ R6,022,000 Transkeian Estimates) = R35,778,OOO ; 1973/74 -
R101,500,000. The first two figures are from the 1969 Annual Report of
the Department of Bantu Education (RP 18/1971) - with the Transkeian
Estimates from the 1968 Annual Report of the Transkei Department of
Education. The 1973/74 figure was broadcast on 5ABC in the Transvaal
in December 1973. (Miss Joan Laithwaite of the Union Acceptances Research
Department was kind enough to track down the details for me).
14. SAS 1972, E-39. Increases children at school - based on 50 Years, E-23
and SAS "1968, 1972. Percentage population in school - BEJ, May 1973,
p. 18, and I.W. van der Merwe, Die Finansiering van Primflre en Sekondgre
Bantoe-Onderwys (roufjh title of UNISA H.Ed, thesis, 1971), Table 1. "
15. Coloured J.C. and S.C. candidates and passes - I have mislaid precise
source ; I think it was the most recent annual report of the Administration
of Coloured Affairs. Increased school-populations - SAS 1968, 1972
(my % calculations). Increased proportion of Coloured population at
school - my calculations using Census data for I960, 1970. Class distri-
bution of schoolchildren - 50 Years, E-23, SAS 1968, 1972.
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I6* E.P. Herald 24/1/74 - free textbooks for highschool forms 1, 3, 4 in 1974.
E.P. Herald 1/2/74 - for 1976 target (interview MrT K.B. Hartshorn, Director
(Planning) of Department of Bantu Education). Plans do not at present cover
setworks or exercise books.
17. Keith Bryer, "Africans on Brink of Breakthrough", E.P. Herald 23 and
25/5/73. I am grateful to Mr. Bryer for drawing these facts to my
attention and sending me cuttings.
18. Department of Labour, Manpower Surveys No. 8 (1969) and No. 9 (1971).
I have not been able to obtain a reliable assessment of the accuracy of
statistics in these Surveys (either absolute or relative to one another).
Apprentices in Employment
White Coloured Indian Total
(••/•
1969 37551 4906 481 42938
1971 40656 6937 1565 49158
According to these figures the employment ratio (White to non-White)
on the margin was roughly 1:1 whereas in 1969 the average ratio was 7:1.
19. I am hoping to publish some of these figures in due course. Sample data
on incomes of urban households during the 1960's are to be found in
UNISA Bureau of Market Research reports e.g. Africans in Pretoria,
Johannesburg and Durban (Research Reports 27.1, 27.2 and 27.4), Coloured*
in the Cape Peninsula (Report 27.6) and Asians in Durban *-P in e town
(Report 27.3).
20
* Transvaler 16/10/73 - ,,Dit Alles het die Regering Gedoen"; RDM 23/10/73 -
"Janson offers new deal for urban Africans"; RDM 25/10/73 - "Moving
Towards a New S.A.;" "Soweto is going to get lit up;" Star 29/10/73 -
V report of speech by Mr. Janson (Deputy Minister of Bantu Affairs and
Administration) in Soweto : he agreed "present living conditions of Blacks
were not right by any stretch of the imagination" and added "I sympathise
with your plight." See also the interesting series on Coloured progress
and problems in Transvaler, 29th - 31st October and 2nd November, 1973 -
of which the last dealt with housing under the headline "Coloureds live
in a 'pis-sty'".
21. Alan de Kock, "A Multinational Company at the Interface" : report to
Interface National Convention 1974 by General Motors South African.
(Mr. Keith Bryer kindly helped me to obtain a copy of this report).
22. This point was made to me by Professor de Vries of the Stellenbosch
Bureau of Economic Research.
23. This phrase was repeatedly used by Mr. P.W. Botha (Minister of Defence
and Cape Leader of the National Party) to describe Government policy
to the Coloured group in an election speech I heard him give in the










I refer here to an intervention by Mr. J. Kane-Berman.
to the "call-in card" system and other developments.
He referred
Albie Sachs, "Law Enforcement and Domination in Southern Africa",
paper for the Mt. Kisco Conference (forthcoming in published proceedings).
Sachs defines several categories of "race-statutes" and his statistics
show that between 1967 and 1972 prosecutions under these declined as a
percentage of all prosecutions (after rising markedly since 19*7). I
should make it clear that Sachs would not approve of the use I am makinp
of his figures.
In discussion Francis Wilson questioned whether we knew enough yet to
make this supposition. He thought the decline in pass-law prosecutions
between 1968 and 1972 might prove to be temporary.
See the Sachs paper (footnote 25.).
Several scholars who are much closer to the National Party and to
Afrikaner society than I am (including Dr. Andre du Toit at the Workshop)
were sceptical that interesting constitutional proposals of the sort
I allude to are actually in the pipeline or likely to be recommended
by the Theron Commission.
See Merle Lipton "South Africa : authoritarian reform?". The World Today,
June 197*f, for an interesting discussion of political change, especially
pp. 251-4.
This statement lacks precise content. I have indicated earlier in the
text how I think power might be redistributed to the Coloured group within
an apartheid framework. For Africans it seems to me that there are sini la~
consultative functions which in practice night change the character of
legislation affecting Africans ; and there are also federal or confederai
constitutional outcomes which may develop out of "separate development"
tendencies.
The thesis that economic growth is a major "progressive" determinant of
South Africa's social and political future was developed in the controvert
with the National Party post-1948 over the feasibility of apartheid.
It was fundamentally "integrationist" in that context - and continued to
be so as a matter of course when it was turned against the revolutionary
••pessimists" (who had no interest themselves In challenging the inte-
grationist bias).
I refer to Dr. Jan de V. Graaf. I do not
question.
his present views on this
- 27 -
33. A striking example is Nathan Glazer's article, "The Universalisation
of Ethnicity" , Encounter, February 1975. He concludes with a powerful
statement which I believe almost exactly describes some of the debates
in the last 2 decades among English-speaking intellectuals in South
Africa : "In a world in which the arrant nonsense of Marxism competed
with the tepid confusions of liberalism, the problems of Ethnicity,
as a source of conflict within nations and between nations, have generally
appeared as simply a left-over, an embarrassment from the past. It is
my conviction they must now be placed at the very centre of our concern
for the human condition". ;
I hope I am correct in interpreting some of the signatures to the
SPROCAS Political Commission's Report In this way. Mr. -Allister Sparks
was also explicit about past mistakes at the Bulugha Conference.
"English Contribution to the Economic Development of South Africa",
Conference on English-Speaking South Africa Today, July 1974. (I believe
it is planned to publish a record of the proceedings).
It is this alleged "inevitability" (or "automatic" character of change)
that the SPROCAS Economics Commission seized on critically in discussinc.
O'Dowd's view : Power, Privilege and Poverty, pp. 60-64.
This general approach is interestingly stated in Hollis Chenery, Montek
S. Ahluwahlia, C.L.G. Bell, John H. Duloy, Richard Jolly, Redistribution
With Growth (O.U.P. 1974).
Eastern Europe contains interesting (and depressing) historical precedert-:
I offer the following quotation as deserving of attention : "It had be«n
supposed that workers and peasants would be free from nationalism; thi.c
was true in the days of mass illiteracy. Mow Austria had had universal
elementary education; and every man who can read and write must define
his national allegiance". A.J.P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy (Peregrine
edition, p. 229.)
39. Professor Sampie Terreblanche in Vemuwing en Herskikking (Tafelberp,
Cape Town, 1973) seems to be making some such point as this - particularly
in his criticism of the Progressive Party Whom he interprets as growth -
maximizers. See e.g. pp. 62-69.
40. I refer to a draft paper for the Mr, Kisco conference : "The Implications
for Blacks of Economic changes now taking place in Southern Africa."
(forthcoming in revised form).
41. Terence Beard of Rhodes University stressed this point to me in discussion
SAS 1968 = South African Statistics 1968 (Department of Statistics).
SAS 1972 = South African Statistics 1972 (Department of Statistics 1.
BEJ = Bantu Education Journal
RDM = Rand Daily Kail
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